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Ranney: Exclusionary Rule

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE-THE ILLUSION VS.
THE REALITY
James T. Ranney*
I.

INTRODUCTION'

It is with a growing sense of frustration that I have watched
the long and continuing debate over the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. It has struck me many times that the doctrinaire assertions on both sides of this controversy frequently bear very little
relationship to the reality I saw first as an assistant district attorney and later as director of a legal research center dealing with
questions of criminal law and procedure on a day-to-day basis. It is
this perceived reality which has largely informed my judgment on
the exclusionary rule, and which I hope to be able to convey in this
essay.
What I have seen is, I believe, not good on the whole; it is bad,
so bad that we ought to abandon totally the Mapp v. Ohio exclusionary rule. Thus, I am prepared to go even further than the Burger Court recently did in the Leon and Sheppard cases.2 It has not
been easy for a person who is opposed to virtually everything that
Orrin Hatch and Strom Thurmond have done in other contexts to
reach this conclusion, one that is no doubt contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy amongst those of us who view ourselves as
"liberals."
Before discussing the reasons for this view, I would note
briefly that the first step in reaching this position is one that I
have been long ready to take. That is, I have long believed that the
* B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1966; J.D., Harvard University, 1969; Clerk for Honorable Thomas Fairchild, Seventh Circuit Court of. Appeals 1969-70; Assistant District Attorney, Deputy Chief, Appeals Division, Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, 1970-74;
Freelance Writer, 1975-77;Director of Montana Criminal Law Information Research Center
(MONTCLIRC) and Research Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law,
1977-date.
The views expressed here are in no way those of the MONTCLIRC research program
and do not, I believe, affect my ability to accurately provide case law helpful to either side
on search and seizure law.
1. This article is a revised version of some "Prepared Remarks" submitted to accompany testimony given before the Montana House Judiciary Committee on February 21,
1983, in regard to H.B. 816, which would have adopted at least portions of the general approach recommended in this article. The bill did not pass, primarily because the Legislature
wanted to await the outcome of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
2. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S.
Ct. 3424 (1984) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to evidence obtained by officers
acting in "reasonable good faith" reliance upon a search warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate).
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exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required.' Because my
main purpose is not to discuss the constitutional question, leaving
that to the Court, I would merely note that the basic reason for my
position on the constitutional question is quite simple: something
(here, the exclusionary rule) that is not even desirable as a matter
of simple legislative policy, can not possibly become a necessity of
"due process." Of course, it will be argued that it is not a question
of what we want to do, but what the Constitution commands.
While this argument would be compelling if the fourth amendment
explicitly said, "P.S.: One remedy for violation of the Amendment
is an exclusionary rule," such is not the case, and no amount of
circumlocution or pretending to follow the dictates of the fourth
amendment can hide this fact. Since the exclusionary rule has been
3. At least absent the rare case where the police conduct "shocks the conscience." See
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (the famous "stomach pump" case).
Although I would not limit the due process clause to its arguable historical meaning
(merely a right to "due tryal") and while I also concede that it can be interpreted as evidencing more than simply a concern for "reliability" in the truth-determining process at
trial, I do not believe that acceptance of the viability of the Rochin principle-that even
reliable confessions may be inadmissible where the methods used to obtain them seriously
offend the community's sense of decency-necessarily requires acceptance of the Mapp rule
in all its full-blown hypertechnical glory. For while acceptance of a "dignitary-rights" approach to interpreting the due process clause inevitably puts one on the proverbial "slippery
slope," I am generally more comfortable standing less near the "legislative-policymaking"
end of that slope and nearer the classic Cardozo-Frankfurter "judicial deference" side. If I
did want to do a little "legislating," I would not hide behind "due process" but would use
the supervisory power approach.
With this background in mind, and looking more closely at cases such as Rochin, is it
indeed true, as Yale Kamisar has argued, that there is no basis for distinguishing the
Rochin-type confession cases from the Mapp fourth amendment exclusionary rule? See
Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 77-78 (1978). I submit that there is. For if the
meaning of due process in its "dignitary-rights" aspect is inevitably determined by a gutreaction kind of process into which a wide variety of policy considerations enter, then practical policy reasons for distinguishing the search and seizure situation from the custodial
interrogation context might justify different due process requirements. Thus, if there is typically a greater factual "need" for the exclusionary rule in one context than in the other,
then maybe this factual difference is sufficient to make exclusion a necessity of due process
in one case and not in the other.
Finally then, I submit that there is indeed a greater need for exclusion in the Rochintype confession case than in the typical search and seizure case due to: (1) the distinct
likelihood that the "decency/fairness" component of the voluntariness standard helps to assure satisfaction of the "reliability" element and (2) a generally greater need for strong restraints in what is usually a personal and "coercive" confrontation between the forces of law
enforcement and the individual. This factual difference, for me, makes an exclusionary rule
in the Rochin kind of case at least more desirable as a simple matter of policy than in the
typical search-and-seizure case. Whether this difference is one of constitutional dimension is
another matter, and an issue on which reasonable judges could well differ. But the point
remains that there are substantial policy reasons for backing a concern for "dignitary
rights" in the custodial interrogation context with an exclusionary rule, while not doing so in
the typical search-and-seizure context.
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only relatively recently "discovered" lurking within the confines of
the fourth amendment, the inevitable "anti-majoritarian" argument trotted out about how the very purpose of the Bill of Rights
is to protect helpless minorities against overbearing, "mad dog,"
law-and-order majorities wears rather thin here.4
It seems to be forgotten by some courts and commentators
that the only way the federal exclusionary rule can be applicable to
the states is if it is, indeed, a necessity of due process. Although
the Warren Court did have a disturbing tendency to adopt what I
have occasionally called a "Hey, that's a neat idea" concept of due
process, 5 I doubt very much that the Burger Court will be inclined
to continue this kind of judicial activism or, alternatively, will simply decide that this is not such a "neat idea" after all.'
4. The early origins of the exclusionary rule, in cases involving the question of the
privacy of personal papers (and the right to their return) and mainly based upon the fifth
amendment, are briefly discussed in Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations:
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1363-64 (1981). Certainly, this
unique historical context goes a long way toward explaining how the unusual remedy of
excluding concededly reliable evidence ever could have been dreamed up.
The more immediate origins of the exclusionary rule, as applied to the states, are very
thoughtfully and entertainingly detailed in F. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESs REVOLUTION: THE
WARREN COURT'S IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAW, 37-49, 130-32 (1970). Graham makes three particularly interesting observations about Mapp v. Ohio. First, he notes that the author of the
opinion in Mapp, Justice Clark, as a 23-year-old lawyer handling his first criminal case, had
unsuccessfully tried to free the son of his family's Negro maid by arguing for an exclusionary rule. Second, he argues that the leading pre-Mapp decision, Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), had "lulled [two generations of judges] by the feeling that no doctrine
that received the unanimous blessing of the Supreme Court of 1914 could be dangerously
generous to defendants," the "fallacy of that assumption" being that the Court in Weeks
"fully appreciated what it was undertaking; for while its ruling was deceptively clear-cut,
the Court's reason for making it was doctrinaire [based upon at least some doctrine concerning the fifth amendment, later repudiated, see Schroeder, 69 GEo. L.J. at 1363 n.10] and
unsupported by an analysis of where it would eventually lead." GRAHAM, supra, at 130.
Third, he also notes the impact of the civil rights movement, law enforcement at this time
being viewed as part of "the problem," especially in the South. Id. at 12-13.
5. I.e., if some rule of law being urged upon the Court as being constitutionally mandated struck a majority of the Court as being simply a "neat idea," then they would say
sure, it must be required by that good old fudge-factor clause, the "due process" clause.
6. Those who object to the use of the term "judicial activism," at least in this instance,
ought to reflect upon the fact that the Court in Mapp overruled prior law (Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949)) despite the fact that defense counsel, hoping instead to win on another
question, had not even raised the issue of the continuing validity of Wolf. Thus, the prosecution never had any real opportunity to brief or argue the question of the exclusionary
rule. The majority noted, somewhat disingenuously, that counsel "did not insist that Wolf
be overruled," although one amicus had raised the question. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 646 n.3 (1961). The dissent more accurately noted that the question was not in petitioner's jurisdictional statement nor was it briefed or argued; "[ijndeed when pressed by
questioning from the bench whether he [defense counsel] was not in fact urging us to overrule Wolf, counsel expressly disavowed any such purpose"; the amicus' "request" for the
Court to "reconsider" Wolf appeared in one lone sentence, without statement of reasons.
See id. at 673-75.
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Thus, the truly difficult question, which is already before us
after Leon and Sheppard, is what ought the states to do in this
area as a matter of policy, either by means of their legislative
power or through their courts' interpretation of their own state
constitutions or exercise of their supervisory power. 7 And this policy issue brings us to the fundamental question of whether the
Mapp exclusionary rule is a good idea, assessed on the basis of
plain common sense.

II.
A.

ADVANTAGES

OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The UtilitarianDeterrence Rationale

The central argument for the exclusionary rule is that it is
designed to protect the fourth amendment rights of all of us by
educating the police and deterring them from illegal conduct. And
a strong case can be made that the United States, unlike a country
such as Great Britain, which is more homogeneous in population
and has a very well-trained police force, has more need for an exclusionary rule in order to deter improper police conduct (especially in regard to the harassment of minorities and

"undesirables").
Likewise, there is no doubt that the exclusionary rule has an
important "tone-setting" psychological effect. Total abolition of
the exclusionary rule, unless very carefully explained, might give
the police the erroneous impression that the fourth amendment
has been abolished, and that they are now free to do as they like.8
Finally, the argument also has been made that the exclusionary rule permits the fine-tuned development of fourth amendment
law. This development is something that a "good faith" exception
arguably would not do, since a close question of fourth amendment
law need not be addressed where the police conduct satisfied the
reasonable good faith standard.9
As to this essential point, then, it does seem to me that despite some imperfections, the exclusionary rule has proven to have
a significant impact on police search-and-seizure conduct. Most po7. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
H~Av. L. REV. 489 (1977); Note, Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324 (1982). See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
155 (2d ed. 1972) (example of supervisory power rule).
8. Of course, as noted below, this would not be true, for a wide variety of civil remedies now exist.
9. But see the discussion infra as to how the exclusionary rule may, instead, be actually corrupting the development of fourth amendment law. See also Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422
n.26.
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lice are schooled in the law of search and seizure, and not inconsiderable efforts are made to follow the dictates of the fourth amendment in order to avoid suppression of evidence, all of which
apparently did not occur, at least to this extent, prior to Mapp v.
Ohio. And while the abolition of the exclusionary rule would not
make me feel any less secure in my privacy rights, there would be
some remaining concern about the lot of the typical minority or
political undesirable. In short, although I do not think we would
see a return to pre-1961 standards of police behavior if Mapp were
reversed (and we have Mapp to thank for hastening the reform in
this area), it remains true, I think, that Mapp is to date our only
proven deterrent. Thus, it can be contended that we should not
abandon a proven system for protecting fourth amendment rights
until equally effective alternative remedies are in place.
B.

The "JudicialIntegrity" Argument

The second argument for Mapp is the so-called "imperative of
judicial integrity"10 claim, something to the effect that courts
should not lend their support to or "sanction" illegal police activity
by admitting into evidence the results of illegal police conduct. Although this argument has a certain surface plausability, it is difficult to know what to make of it, especially in view of the long
string of United States Supreme Court decisions (some from the
Warren Court era) which have given the argument short shrift. In
these decisions, the Court has admitted Mapp-tainted evidence for
impeachment purposes, or in grand jury proceedings, or in numerous other noncriminal-trial contexts, where the need for the evidence was found to outweigh the minimal incremental deterrent
value of applying the exclusionary rule.' All of this suggests that
the "judicial integrity" argument is something of a "make-weight"
argument. Certainly, it has not been applied to totally preclude
trial of a person illegally arrested.12 So one is left to wonder if, in
the last analysis, the argument consists of anything more than the
substitution of high-sounding phrases for a careful, common-sense
analysis of the consequences of one course of action versus
another.
10. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
11. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L.
REV. 664, 667-72 (1970).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S.
519 (1952).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1985

5

294

MONTANA
Montana
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 46 REVIEW
[1985], Iss. 2, Art. 4

III.
A.

[Vol. 46

DISADVANTAGES OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Exclusionary Rule Frees the Guilty

The first and most obvious disadvantage of the exclusionary
rule is that it frees the guilty. Several points can be made, however, which may ameliorate this disadvantage. First, some studies
indicate that only a very small percentage of defendants are actually freed by the exclusionary rule.' 3 Second, a more subtle point is
that maybe it is not so terrible that some people are freed, given
the typical "overreach" of much of our substantive criminal law
and, more importantly, the state of our prison system. It may be
that an individual who is unexpectedly freed, due to the operation
of the exclusionary rule, has a better chance of "rehabilitation" out
of prison than he would in prison. It may be the first real break
that he ever got in his entire life, which in itself could have a beneficial impact.
I make this comment to suggest what is perhaps a deeper
point about the exclusionary rule and an explanation of how such a
seemingly paradoxical rule could have been tolerated at all. At
least part of the reason, in my opinion, that we adopted such an
unusual "cut-off-your-nose-to-spite-your-face" kind of rule is that
we are not really as serious about the importance of the end goals
of the criminal justice system (for example, rehabilitation or incapacitation) as we sometimes say we are. For if we were truly serious about the importance of these end goals, would we deprive
ourselves of information that is clearly relevant to deciding
whether an individual should be subjected to the various sentencing dispositions? No, we would not. If we were trying to decide the
results of some truly important matter, such as a presidential election, would we deprive ourselves of information relevant to making
that critical decision merely because a candidate had violated a
technical rule? No, we would not. Why the difference when it
comes to evidence relevant to criminal cases? I think that at least
part of the answer is our secret suspicion that because of the generally dismal state of our so-called "correctional" system, we are
not actually able to effectuate the goals of our criminal justice
system.
This, however, is a poor excuse for a rule of law. If we feel
13. See Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Research on "Lost" Arrests,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 611. But see National Institute of Justice, The Effects of
the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California (1982) (larger numbers of cases dropped in
screening or plea bargaining due to operation of the exclusionary rule).
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queasy about the state of our prisons (and we should), the answer
is not to sporadically release a few murderers and rapists into our
midst, but to do something positive about this concern, by making
our penitentiaries places where at least some pretense of rehabilitation occurs.14 In short, we should take more seriously the importance of the stated goals of our criminal justice system (assuming
we can ever agree on what precisely they are, and their relative
priority) rather than deprive the truth-determining process in
criminal cases of relevant information.
Before leaving the first point, it may be noted that a not insignificant consequence of freeing the guilty is that some of the individuals who are freed because of the exclusionary rule are going to
commit serious crimes, including killing people. Thus, unless we
are either naive or totally lacking in intelligence, there should be
no doubt in any of our minds but that numerous lives throughout
this country have been forfeited because of the operation of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule. And who can put a value on
a human life?
B.

The Exclusionary Rule Undermines Our Sense of Justice

Another disadvantage of the exclusionary rule is that it does
nothing for the innocent victim of an illegal search. It is no rebuttal, as Professor LaFave attempts to do, to counter that "this argument misperceives the function of the exclusionary rule. '15 The
point remains that the exclusionary rule does not provide any direct relief to those innocent persons aggrieved by unreasonable
searches and seizures. This departure from the normal remedial
operation of the law is only one small aspect of an even larger
problem, however.
One cannot escape the conclusion that the exclusionary rule
violates our sense of justice. Many years ago, as a law student talking to average citizens about the exclusionary rule, it was obvious
to me that despite all the efforts made to justify it, the general
public just does not believe in the exclusionary rule. Although the
law should not depend upon what the "general masses" may
"feel," it does seem that the public is on to something here. When
the victim in a rape case sees the person who raped her walk free
because of the operation of the exclusionary rule, it violates the
victim's sense of justice. Quite simply, two wrongs do not make a
14. Indeed, if we were truly serious about the fourth amendment, we would do something that would really get the attention of the police, for example civilian review boards.
See infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
15. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2 at 23 (1978).
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right. The public's sense of injustice in such cases may lead (and,
according to anecdotal stories it has led) to private retribution. If
the criminal justice system is seen as ineffective in achieving its
major goals, then we are in danger of encouraging vigilante justice
and a disregard for law.16
C.

The Exclusionary Rule Occasions Substantial Monetary
Costs and Court Delays

Perhaps a much more important disadvantage is the monetary
cost occasioned by the exclusionary rule. Incredible amounts of litigation are generated by the exclusionary rule, from pretrial suppression motions to appeals and state and federal collateral attacks. My own experience as an assistant district attorney in
Philadelphia in the early 1970's was that upwards of 70% of our
time was spent litigating issues that had absolutely nothing to do
with the question of guilt or innocence, with perhaps 50% of our
total time being spent on nothing but fourth amendment exclusionary rule questions. Our office alone consisted of 160 attorneys,
with double that number in support staff. With the additional cost
of defense counsel, judges, courtrooms, and their staff, the cost
each year is enormous. To those who make the inevitable response
that criminal "justice" (of course, begging the question as to what
is "justice") is priceless and that the cost should be irrelevant, it
must be said that this attitude simply overlooks the fact that there
are only two sources of such funds: either new taxes (unlikely in
the extreme) or fewer government expenditures for things such as
hospitals, schools, and prisons.
Likewise, the exclusionary rule is obviously a substantial contributor to one of the most significant problems in our legal system
today, that of court delay. The handling of fourth amendment exclusionary rule questions in trial and appellate courts obviously
crowds other cases from the dockets. For instance, every year the
United States Supreme Court feels obliged to decide another dozen
5-4 decisions supposedly trying to clarify the law in this difficult
area, often creating still more litigation as to the meaning of the
most recent cases.
16. See, e.g., Missoulian, March 31, 1985, at 10 ("Goetz to be Entangled in Legal System He Hates.. .. Subway gunman Bernhard Goetz probably will spend the rest of 1985
enmeshed in a court system that he says he despises because it lets 'criminals get out of jail
before their victims get out of the hospital.' "); NEWSWEEK, February 4, 1985, at 23 ("A
Break for New York's 'Vigilante' ").
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The Exclusionary Rule Undermines the Integrity of Both
the Police and the Judiciary

It is by now well known that there are substantial questions as
to the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in controlling some areas of
police activity. While the occasional inefficacy of the exclusionary
rule is not by itself an excuse for abolishing it, it is nevertheless a
distinct disadvantage of the way it operates in practice. Its inefficacy begins at the level of decision making by the police. For instance, it is doubtful that the police understand what they did
wrong or learn very much when five years after the action in question, after state and federal lower court judges have sustained the
validity of their actions, a badly divided Supreme Court concludes
17
that their search warrant was erroneous.
The result of such frustration is that the exclusionary rule now
leads to police perjury. For instance, there are dozens of decisions
prior to the famous Miranda decision (to use an example from another context) in which courts were faced with police testimony
that they actually gave the detailed four-part Miranda warning to
suspects even before the Miranda decision came down."' Studies in
the fourth amendment context also point to the prevalence of police perjury when faced with the consequences of exclusion.1 9 Police perjury, in turn, may affect future incidents of crime. What
happens to the rehabilitation of the defendant who believes,
rightly or wrongly, that the only reason he is in jail is because a
police officer lied at his suppression hearing?
I submit that the exclusionary rule even may account in part
for some instances of police corruption. For if the police feel that
defendants can literally get away with murder (and they are right
as to this part of it), then they may also tend to feel why should
17. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). One wag has asked how
the prosecution would feel if they had had Justice Fortas, who dissented, sign the search
warrant at issue in Spinelli.
18. See Evans v. Swenson, 455 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1972) (held that the officer in May of
1968 had given the full Miranda warnings "in substance"); Sheer v. United States, 414 F.2d
122 (5th Cir. 1969) (held, without quoting the warnings given, that the testimony supported
the conclusion that the defendant had received "substantially" the same warnings as later
required by Miranda); State v. Travis, 49 N.J. 428, 431, 231 A.2d 205, 207 (1967) (another
pre-Miranda confession case upholding the trial court's finding that the prosecution witnesses' testimony that they had given Miranda warnings was "vague, inconsistent and
lacked candor").
19. See Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants
and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 408-11; Oaks, supra note 11, at
739-42; Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 839
(1974). See also F. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 136-38 (noting dramatic increase in "dropsy"
cases after Mapp).
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they not get away with a little petty larceny or other minor
infraction.
The exclusionary rule has also had a deleterious impact upon
the judiciary. As can be documented in part by dozens of Supreme
Court decisions and thousands of lower court decisions, the exclusionary rule tends to make even our courts act a bit "dishonestly,"
stretching the law here, twisting it there, and doing whatever else
is necessary in an effort to save a case. To find evidence for this
point, one only need look at the hundreds of law review articles on
much of the Court's handiwork in the area of search and seizure,
each commentator vying with the other for the highest degree of
invective and sarcasm.2 0 Even a Supreme Court Justice, concurring
in a recent decision, came close to admitting that there is an inevitable pressure on the courts to dilute fourth amendment rights:
Having reached this decision on the facts of this case, I recognize-as the dissenting opinions find it easy to proclaim-that
the law of search and seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on
what it has held previously, let alone on how these cases should
be decided. Much of this difficulty comes from the necessity of
applying the general command of the fourth amendment to evervarying facts; more may stem from the often unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which spur the Court to reduce
its analysis to simple mechanical rules so that the constable has a
fighting chance not to blunder. 1
E.

The Exclusionry Rule Adversely Affects the Rights of the
Average Defendant

It is further submitted (admittedly without any evidentiary
basis other than a "hunch") that because police have a markedly
negative attitude toward the fourth amendment exclusionary rule,
the right of the average citizen (or even the average criminal) to be
20. One commentator's articles alone convey a sense of this popular academic sport.
See LaFave, Probable Cause From Informants: The Effect of Murphy's Law on Fourth
Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1; LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the "Quagmire," 8 CRiM. L. BUL. 9 (1972); LaFave,
Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law... Has Not. . . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL.
L.F. 255.
Recent qualified entries in this contest include the following: Alschuler, Bright Line
Fever-and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 227 (1984); Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257 (1984); Comment, Searching for the Fourth Amendment, 44 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 285 (1983).
21. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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free from truly serious police misconduct is less safeguarded under
our current regime than it would be without an exclusionary rule.
The reason for this is police frustration arising out of cases in
which, for example, through sheer inadvertence or inability to anticipate unusual case law, a conviction is thrown out. It is doubtful
in such cases that the police learn anything unless, unfortunately,
it is to do the kind of thing that led to the civil rights case of
United States v. Delerme,2 2 in which an officer had chased a traffic
offender through town, and upon apprehending him, summarily
"punished" him with a beating.
There is another way in which the exclusionary rule may be
adversely affecting the rights of the accused. Since Mapp v. Ohio
was decided, we have seen a tremendous shift in emphasis in criminal litigation from what should be the central questions of guilt or
innocence and proper sentencing, to the "game playing" associated
with fourth amendment litigation.2 3 This is very unfortunate, for
our court system has quite enough trouble in providing a fair trial
without having an additional "encumbrance" diverting attention
from these critical functions. We ought to do everything we possibly can, even at substantial cost, to provide an accused a fair trial,
providing all the constitutional and other procedural safeguards
which help assure the integrity of the truth-determining process.
But to spend large quantities of money and vast amounts of time
on issues having nothing to do with guilt or innocence is not at all
wise, at least in this precise context.24
Moreover, in addition to this deflection of the criminal justice
system away from what ought to be its central purposes, it seems
altogether likely that the operation of the exclusionary rule, with
the concomitant public outrage, has tended to create a situation in
which judicial or legislative measures that might help to provide a
truly fairer trial are less likely to be adopted. Further, at the sentencing stage, I wonder whether some of the general hostility towards the exclusionary rule, which easily becomes transposed into
the feeling that the courts are "too soft" on criminals, does not
contribute heavily to the lengthy sentences for which American
courts are so notorious. The upshot is that when one of the unfortunates who does not get off because of the exclusionary rule
comes up for sentencing, the public sentiment is to "get him" and
22. 457
23. See
ary Rule, 95
24. See
confessions).

F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1972).
Wilkey, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment by Alternatives to the ExclusionF.R.D. 211, 222 (1983).
supra note 3 (possibly a different balance must be drawn in the context of
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"get him good." Query also whether some of the current movement
toward mandatory sentencing, especially some of the more extreme
and unreasonable forms of it, has not received a large part of its
impetus from hostility to the exclusionary rule. In short, if one
looks hard at the reality of how the exclusionary rule operates in
practice, it seems all too likely that it has had a very detrimental
25
impact upon the actual rights of the average defendant.
F.

Summary

Weighing and balancing the advantages of our current exclusionary rule regime against the disadvantages, I for one find that
the latter outweigh the former. Other people might put other items
into the balance, or might weigh the same imponderables differently. 26 But reaching the fundamental conclusion above, I am
forced to say that as a simple matter of policy, I do not favor the
Mapp approach, regardless of what is done with new alternatives.
Other alternatives, however, do exist, and they have a significant
impact on the ultimate question of what we should do to protect
fourth amendment rights, without needlessly imperilling other
worthwhile goals.

IV.
A.

ALTERNATIVES TO

Mapp v. Ohio

Modifications to the Exclusionary Rule

We are, of course, already on our way as a matter of federal
constitutional law to the "reasonable good faith" rule or "exception," with or without warrants. Although this approach is clearly
preferable to our present one, it has the drawback of not eliminating entirely the wasteful suppression hearings, concomitant appel25. But since, when push comes to shove, we basically seem to not "give a darn" about
those unfortunate souls who drift through the darkened corridors of the criminal justice
system, the armchair liberals can go on comfortably repeating the hallowed shibboleths surrounding the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.
26. Indeed, I would "welcome a dialogue," as they say, on whether this balancing of
the pros and cons (again, on the simple common sense question of whether Mapp should be
adopted as a matter of legislative policy) was adequate and fairly conducted. I am conscious
of the fact that to some extent I have written this piece in an effort to get some things off
my chest, and have been occasionally provocative and/or emotional, perhaps overstating
points a bit. But maybe this will further the dialogue.
I might even go further here, and state that, given the closeness (in my mind) of the
policy question, I would not object to varying judgments being made by state courts on
"the" exclusionary rule (or, better yet, a variety of exclusionary rules) by way of experimentation. Then it finally would become possible to make some reasonably informed judgments
on which system works best. In some states, such as Montana, where a higher premium is
placed on personal privacy than on security and other concerns, a "balance" might be drawn
differently from one drawn in high crime jurisdictions.
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late litigation, and at least some of the other disadvantages of our
current system. It is no doubt true that after several years of almost invariably unsuccessful efforts to suppress evidence under
this test, fewer and fewer hearings would be held. And contrary to
frequent assertions that the "reasonable good faith" test would
simply entail an additional burdensome level of inquiry thereby
lengthening suppression hearings, common sense suggests that on
balance the hearings will be fewer and shorter, no hearings being
required where it is clear that good faith existed, despite an arguably hard question under current law. In sum, although it will no
doubt be claimed (and not without some justification) that the
"reasonable good faith" approach is nothing more than a hollow
pretense, this alternative, while imperfect, is still better than what
we now have.
One could take the additional step of making even this narrowed exclusionary rule applicable only if it were in fact true, in a
given jurisdiction, that there were no effective alternatives such as
civilian police commissions or municipal liability for vindicating
fourth amendment rights. For despite the Court's protests, it
should be reasonably clear to any legal realist that an essential premise of Mapp was the unavailability of such alternatives.2 7 Hence,
where there are viable alternatives, no exclusionary rule need exist.
This kind of conditionally available rule would have the advantage
of being an incentive for jurisdictions to create effective alternative
remedies, instead of relying upon the unhappy remedy of excluding perfectly reliable evidence. This approach would thus eliminate
the current "catch-22" situation where efforts to create workable
civil remedies are impeded by the existence of the exclusionary
rule and, at the same time, efforts to eliminate the exclusionary
rule are hindered by the lack of fully adequate alternative
remedies.
Another variant to the above proposals is to combine (1) an
initial assessment (as outlined above) as to whether exclusion is
indeed required in view of the availability of other remedies with
(2) a balancing of the need for exclusion (i.e., the need for deterrence, including an assessment of the seriousness of the violation of
fourth amendment rights) against the need for the evidence (i.e.,
27. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651, 652 (1961) ("factual considerations"
supposedly "not basically relevant" to question of existence of the exclusionary rule; but the
Court then engages in a lengthy effort to demonstrate factually the "obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other remedies") with Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 634, 636 (1965) (candid recognition that factual premises in Mapp as
to "worthless and futile" nature of alternative remedies were major basis for conclusion that
the exclusionary rule "was the only effective deterrent to lawless police action").
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the seriousness of the charge). This latter weighing analysis is one
in which the Court has already engaged on many occasions when
assessing the scope of the Mapp rule. Why could not this same
type of inquiry be utilized in regard to the exclusionary rule itself?.
It has the advantage of addressing more directly the underlying
concerns involved when dealing with the issue of exclusion of
evidence.
It would no doubt be argued that such a discretionary rule
would be used rarely to exclude evidence. But exclusion should be
a relatively extraordinary remedy, not one utilized needlessly or
routinely, and only in exceptional cases (1) where necessary (the
Mapp premise) and (2) where the need for exclusion outweighs the
reasons for nonexclusion. Thus, in practice, you likely would see
exclusion primarily in minor drug cases and the like, in which the
police misconduct was flagrant, i.e., it involved "bad faith.""
B.

Civil Suits

Unlike when the exclusionary rule was first adopted, there
now exists a number of newly effective or newly created civil remedies. At the federal level there are civil rights actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (available against state police officers), remedies
under the Federal Torts Claims Act,2 9 and an action under a new
Court-created remedy in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.3 0 Further, in some states, a person
whose fourth amendment rights have been violated may have a viable action against the state. 1 It seems to me that to some degree
these remedies have been unduly neglected because the existence
of the exclusionary rule has tended to shift the attention of lawyers
away from such civil suits. They ought to be used more
extensively.
It is true that because the defendant is less likely to be believed (unless he has other witnesses) and because of the relatively
small financial resources of most law enforcement officers, the possibility of a civil law suit against an individual officer is not an
28. That such a revised exclusionary rule would be severely limited in scope is not
troubling to me, of course, since I favor its total abolition. It may be noted, however, that
even under Mapp, due to the extent to which police perjure themselves and courts bend
over backwards to avoid exclusion of evidence, we ended up with exclusion of evidence in
pretty much the same limited category of cases, i.e., minor drug cases in which the police
misconduct was blatant.
29. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1982).
30. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 1386-92.
31. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 1386, 1390.
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effective remedy by itself. At least a partial answer to this difficulty, however, would be to create municipal liability. Providing a
financial incentive for lawsuits to protect civil rights, it would also
put pressure on local officials to effectively regulate their police
departments.
This is not the place for a detailed treatment of a proposal for
municipal liability, but a few basic points may be made. First, recovery for both mental distress and punitive damages should be
permitted, albeit with some reasonable maximums on each. For if
recovery were limited to physical damages, there would almost
never be any recovery, and hence no incentive for a lawsuit. On the
other hand, damages arising solely out of the fact that a person
committed a crime, and that society responded appropriately with
arrest and incarceration, should not be compensated. Such injuries
are properly attributed to the criminal conduct itself and not to
any investigative misconduct by the police.
Finally, thought should be given to the standard of liability
that municipalities should have. Recovery ought not to be permitted for every minor mistake in filling out a search warrant, but
should be allowed only for "bad faith" or, perhaps, "reckless" violations, the kind of harassing, willful misconduct that we really
want most to control. Lesser civil rights violations should be left to
existing civil remedies.
C. Police/CivilianDisciplinary Commissions and Related
Control Mechanisms
Fourth amendment and other civil rights violations could also
be deterred through a variety of mechanisms which more directly
control police behavior, such as civilian (or mixed composition) review boards and internal police investigative procedures. What is
desired is to make any such administrative bodies effective in safeguarding civil rights while at the same time providing procedural
safeguards to insure that the administrative bodies do not become
so oppressive and intrusive that proper law enforcement is hampered and persons actually become afraid to be police officers. Although such control mechanisms appear to have been largely ineffective to date, 2 it seems likely that in the long run some form of
local civilian disciplinary board will be one of the most effective
ways to protect fourth amendment rights. Again, if we are, as we
32. See, e.g., Littlejohn, The Civilian Police Commission: A Deterrent of Police Misconduct, 59 U. D"r. J. Urn. L. 5 (1981). But see Wilkey, supra note 23 (existence of exclusionary rule has deterred creation of various police disciplinary measures).
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say we are, truly serious about securing fourth amendment rights
against police misconduct, it makes sense to do something direct
and affirmative about that concern. Lawyers in particular, as problem solvers, ought to be able to devise a system which achieves the
kind of balance just described.
Without attempting a detailed description of what a good police disciplinary board ought to look like,3" a rough outline of one
approach can be set forth. Created by state legislation, local civilian review boards should exist in all cities over a certain size. The
boards should meet certain guidelines and be approved by the
state attorney general as satisfying those guidelines. The guidelines
would assure minimum criteria for an effective and fair police disciplinary process, while allowing sufficient leeway for local authorities to engage in potentially valuable experimentation with varying
procedures.3 " The following guidelines come most readily to mind.
Complaint forms should be readily available in police stations,
in the offices of city and county prosecutors, and in the office of
the local police disciplinary board. Also, some mechanism should
exist to assure that these completed forms do in fact reach the
chief or responsible officers in each of these locations.
A process to screen and investigate complaints should be provided. The process should screen out clearly frivolous complaints,
with appeal to the full board. Further, since the lack of investigative powers has been the downfall of many past civilian review
boards, these boards also should have the power to ask the local
prosecutor to issue a subpoena, a refusal being appealable.
The board itself should be an objective and impartial tribunal,
with broad representation of various viewpoints. For example, it
could include a criminologist, a public defender, and a prosecutor.
Further, it would be appropriate to have a representative of the
police as a nonvoting member. His nonvoting status would avoid
placing him in an embarrassing position; but his presence on the
board could provide invaluable expertise as to the nature of police
work.
The hearing itself should have several features. First, there
should be a full opportunity for the complainant to present evidence. After a decision has been rendered, there should be disclos33. Indeed, one should probably not do so, since it is preferable in many ways to let
different communities develop their own solutions, any differences serving as valuable
experimentation.
34. A system of "police commissions" has been in place in Montana since 1907 and
might serve as a useful system to study. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-32-4151 to -4164 (1983).
One sees periodic evidence that the system is being used to some extent. See, e.g., Missoulian, Feb. 6, 1985, p. 21 ("Ronan Officers Disciplined for Misconduct").
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ure of the outcome to the complainant, with findings and reasons.3 5
Second, there should be full due process safeguards for the person
against whom the complaint is made. There should be recordings
of the proceedings, if only by tape recorder, and the proceedings
should be reviewable by a court of record only on the record, not
de novo. Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, provision could be
made for appeal to a statewide review board. Such a statewide
board also would be particularly important for insuring review of
police actions in communities too small to adequately staff a local
board.
The ultimate disposition (or recommendation to either the police chief or the mayor) should be within the discretion of the
board, depending on the seriousness of the infraction and any record of prior infractions. The dispositions available should no doubt
range from a mere reprimand or a "demerit" for minor infractions
through temporary suspension, delay in promotion, or demotion, to
dismissal for the most serious infractions. Finally, an officer's reasonable good faith belief that he was acting in accordance with the
law should be a defense in this kind of disciplinary proceeding.
V.

CONCLUSION

The question is not whether to abolish the fourth amendment,
but how to secure most effectively this fundamental civil right
without unnecessarily harmful consequences. No other country on
earth uses an approach that is on its face as absurd as the Mapp v.
Ohio exclusionary rule. Furthermore, a close examination of the
hard realities of this regime demonstrates that we would be better
off without it, and better still with other remedies which more directly attack the problem. This is not to say that any of these
other remedies are perfect. (Nothing in life seems to be.) There are
problems and costs associated with each, but they are far less than
those associated with the Mapp approach.

35. Although this could be difficult with a multimember board, it probably can be
done and would help insure fairness to the parties, as well as provide consistency by developing a kind of "common law" of proper police conduct.
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